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CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING 
Charles M. Rehmus* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SEVERAL years ago, three adjoining school districts in Michigan agreed to cooperate in establishing a high school vocational edu-
cation program. Vocational education is expensive, requiring sub-
stantially more funds for facilities and staff than most other educa-
tional programs. The contemplated three-district plan would have 
allowed each district to provide its students with a vocational cur-
riculum far superior to that which any single district could have 
offered alone. 
While these plans were under consideration, the Michigan 
legislature in 1965 amended its Public Employment Relations Act 
of 1947.1 The 1965 amendments imposed a duty upon school dis-
tricts, cities, and counties to bargain collectively with public em-
ployees on "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.''2 The new legislation gave public employees the right to 
select exclusive bargaining agents by means of a majority vote in 
an appropriate bargaining unit, and it obligated public employers 
to bargain in good faith with the bargaining representatives thus 
certified. If the employing agency violated any of its statutory duties, 
the bargaining agent could file an unfair labor practice charge with 
the Michigan Labor Mediation Board. The new legislation did not, 
however, eliminate that part of the original 1947 legislation which 
prohibited strikes by public employees. 
Pursuant to this new legislation, teacher organizations in each 
of the three Michigan school districts referred to above qualified for 
recognition and began collective bargaining with their respective 
school boards. In nvo of the districts, bargaining over salaries proved 
difficult. Without a master contract, the teachers threatened not to 
report to the classrooms for the opening of the fall semester. How-
ever, in both of these districts the crisis was averted; the school boards 
simply took from their reserve operating funds the amounts that had 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan; Co-Director, Institute of 
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been allocated for the new vocational education program and ap-
plied them toward improvements in faculty salary schedules. As a 
result, plans for the cooperative venture had to be dropped. 
The point of this story is not to decry public employee bargain-
ing. The teachers in the districts involved undoubtedly had legiti-
mate complaints over their salaries. Readjustments in teacher salary 
schedules have long been overdue. The critical national shortage of 
qualified and certified teachers is too well known to require exposi-
tion. But vocational education is also of great importance to our 
society. Should it have been shunted aside because of what happened 
at the bargaining table? Unfortunately, the boards of education in-
volved really had no choice but to divert funds from this promising 
cooperative program. Despite the continued prohibition of strikes 
by public employees in the 1965 legislation, Michigan has thus far 
been unable effectively to prohibit teacher strikes.3 The school 
boards either had to find the money to settle their teacher disputes 
or suffer a prolonged extension of summer vacation. 
Some of the most experienced and distinguished students and 
practitioners of industrial relations in the country take the position 
that all strikes against the government must be prohibited.4 Their 
basic view is that such strikes undermine our political democracy 
and are, therefore, intolerable. This position, although argued with 
logic and brilliance, is from the point of view of local government 
administrators merely an exercise in coruscating on thin ice. 
Public employees who are dissatisfied with the offers made to 
them at the bargaining table have shown themselves to be extraordi-
narily resourceful in devising effective means for bringing pressure 
upon their employers. While it is one thing to say that strikes and 
other lesser forms of disruptive "work action" are or should be il-
legal, it is quite another to formulate enforceable sanctions to deal 
effectively with these pressures. 
If fifty per cent of a police force refuses to work overtime or to 
write traffic tickets, is discharge an appropriate punishment? Alter-
natively, what should administrators do if police officers enforce the 
3. By virtue of School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 
(1968), the injunctive remedy is available against strikes by public employees. The 
granting of such an injunction is subject to traditional equity considerations, however, 
and will not automatically be granted against teacher strikes. 
4. See, e.g., A. Anderson, The Developing State of Collective Bargaining for Public 
Employees (address before the University of Chicago Conference on Public Employees 
and Collective Bargaining), Feb. 5, 1965 (mimeograph); Hildebrand, The Public 
Sector, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 125 (1967). 
March 1969] Constraints on Local Governments 921 
traffic laws so rigidly that they increase the rate of ticketed violations 
fivefold? If most of a city's bus drivers come down with "blue flu," 
is a two-week disciplinary suspension a valuable remedy? What sanc-
tion can be used against firemen who are available to fight fires but 
who refuse to do inspection, clean-up, or paper work in connection 
with their jobs? If three quarters of a district's school teachers are 
willing to resign rather than submit to an injunction, where can re-
placements be found? Absent effective means for eliminating these 
pressures (and none has yet been found), local administrators who are 
responsible for collective bargaining with public employees must 
have the freedom and flexibility to meet at least the minimum of 
employee demands. In most states the administrators of local gov-
ernment have not yet been given such latitude. If public employee 
bargaining is to operate effectively, state legislatures must grant 
greater freedom to local governmental units to raise funds and to 
determine the elements of the employment relationship. Failing this, 
the unwavering demands of employees for a major voice in setting 
their wages and working conditions will mean more bargaining im-
passes, strikes, and disruptive work pressure with disastrous results 
for the public. 
It is to the basic financial and administrative constraints upon the 
powers of local governing units that this Article is primarily directed. 
The examples used are taken largely from Michigan experience and 
Michigan law. The same limitations upon the financial and ad-
ministrative powers of local government, however, exist in almost 
all other states. The Michigan experience with public administration 
and public employee bargaining should provide both a warning and 
a guide to other states as they cope with the so-called public employee 
revolution. 
II. FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 
Three major sources of revenue are available for financing gov-
ernment: taxes on sales, on income, and on property. Of these, the 
property tax is the workhorse of local government; it accounts for 
ninety per cent of local tax revenues in the United States.15 Local 
governments in Michigan-municipalities, counties, and school dis-
tricts-have no authority to levy sales taxes,6 and the development 
5. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A FISCAL PROGRAM FOR A BALANCED 
FEDERALISM 21 (1967). 
6. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 205.51 (1967). 
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of city income taxes is just beginning.7 Thus, Michiganders have 
traditionally relied heavily on the property tax not only to finance 
city and village governments, but also to support townships, counties, 
and school districts. In many areas, three or four local governing 
units, not to mention special district authorities, all depend upon the 
same overburdened property tax base. Nevertheless, the state legisla-
ture, jealous of its own tax sources and protective of its citizens, has 
not permitted much change in local taxing structure. The new Michi-
gan Constitution adopted in 1963 theoretically delegated broad tax-
ing powers to home rule charter cities.8 Despite this, the state legisla-
ture has reserved most nonproperty taxes to itself and has prohibited 
municipalities from levying such taxes without specific legislative 
authorization.9 Moreover, Michigan, like most states, limits the total 
amount of millage that can be levied upon property without specific 
authorization from the voters.10 The specific constitutional limit in 
Michigan upon a city council's unrestricted taxing power is eighteen 
mills, and another fifteen mills must be divided among township 
boards, county supervisors, and school boards.11 
Even those cities that desire to tax themselves more heavily often 
find that the legislature forces them to beg for the privilege. States 
that permit cities to levy income taxes frequently place limitations 
upon the amounts that can be obtained through this resource. It is 
common to find statutes which restrict municipalities to a flat rate 
rather than a progressive income tax, limit the percentage of resi-
dents' income which they can tax, and place even more severe limita-
tions upon the percentage of commuters' incomes which they can 
reach. Michigan, for example, limits city income taxes to a flat rate 
of one per cent and the tax on commuters' incomes to half that 
amount.12 Moreover, state legislatures commonly allow voters a veto 
over new city income taxes, a privilege seldom if ever accorded for 
similar state levies. Under the uniform Michigan city income tax law, 
the imposition of city income taxes is subject to a protest refer-
7. At the present time, fewer than 200 cities in the United States levy an income 
tax, but growth of tbis form of taxation will undoubtedly expand rapidly. 
8. See MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 22. 
9. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.91 (1967). 
10. MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 6. Pennsylvania is an important exception. It is alone 
among the states whose public employees are strongly organized and which permit 
local governing bodies to levy unlimited property taxes without specific voter author• 
ization. 
11. MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 6. 
12. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.611 (1967). 
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endum.13 In order for city councils to obtain an affirmative vote in 
these referendum elections, they must often promise the voters major 
property tax reductions. Thus, the amount of new money generated 
is limited, and much of the purpose of the new taxes is defeated. 
Related to this, the Michigan Constitution prohibits cities from issu-
ing general obligation bonds without an affirmative vote of property 
owners.14 Consequently, many cities, rather than attempting to get 
the voters to approve capital bonds, squeeze capital improvements 
out of their operating millage and further limit the resources avail-
able for short-run operational flexibility. 
These constitutional and legislative constraints upon the taxing 
powers of home rule charter cities are sometimes aggravated by the 
cities themselves. Some cities have in their original charters limited 
the total operating millage which they can levy administratively to 
an amount lower than the state-imposed twenty-mill maximum.15 
This handicaps them further in generating the funds necessary to 
meet employee demands. 
In summary, a state-imposed obligation upon local governments 
to negotiate wages and fringe benefits inevitably entails increased 
budget expenditures for employee compensation. If the state simul-
taneously maintains existing limitations upon the unilateral taxing 
power of local governments, the situation often becomes intolerable. 
Local government administrators are helplessly caught between em-
ployee compensation demands, public unwillingness to vote for in-
creased operating millage levied on property, and the state legisla-
ture's reluctance to allow local governments the freedom to impose 
income, sales, or excise taxes. 
An example which highlights the problem recently occurred in 
Detroit. Following both a "ticket-writing strike" and a "blue flu" 
epidemic among police officers, the disputants finally referred the 
issue of police salaries to a neutral three-member panel for recom-
mendations. The panel found that police officers' salaries should be 
substantially increased. Money to pay the recommended increases 
could be found on an emergency basis within Detroit's current 
operating budget, but beyond the first year, the panel concluded: 
the City of Detroit urgently needs new taxing authority which can 
be granted only by the State Legislature .... Detroit is in serious 
13. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.503 (1967). 
14. MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 6. 
15. Only six of the sixteen largest cities in Michigan are presently levying the 
twenty-mill maximum. 
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financial trouble, and we join others who have suggested that the 
State Legislature raise the authorized level of the municipal income 
tax, to restore the authority to levy local excise taxes, and to revise 
the 2 percent restriction on property tax levies.16 
The problem of .financial straight-jacketing in the face of collec-
tive bargaining pressure is equally serious for school districts. Col-
lective bargaining for Michigan public school teachers appears to 
have produced annual pay increases averaging ten to twenty per cent 
higher than those which the teachers would otherwise have re-
ceived.17 Over all, the salaries of Michigan teachers have increased 
by about one third in the last three years. Most, if not all, of these 
increases were long overdue, but they resulted in severe pressure on 
school district budgets. In the 1966-1967 academic year, the first full 
year of teacher bargaining under the 1965 Act, these increases in 
teacher compensation were paid for largely from minor economies 
and from new revenues. Among the new revenue sources were in-
creases in state aid, imposition of previously authorized millage, 
and growth in assessed valuation. In the second full year of collec-
tive bargaining, however, school districts began to use less desirable 
sources of funds to pay the wage increases demanded by organized 
teachers. Administrators generated new sources of funds through 
liquidation of operating reserves and contingency funds, transfer of 
millage from building and site reserves to operating accounts, and 
substantial program cutbacks. Most important-and despite the fact 
that Michigan law is generally construed to forbid school districts 
from deficit financing18-a quarter of the school districts studied in 
one survey showed a deficit by the end of .fiscal 1968. 
The financial constraints on local governments constitute the 
most serious problem they face in coping with public employee col-
lective bargaining. However, public officials must contend with at 
least three other problems which, although related to financing, are 
not as severe as the shortage of funds per se. The first problem is that 
of coordinating the budget-making process with collective bargain-
ing. An acute aspect of this problem is the difficulty which local gov-
ernmental units face in meeting budget deadlines, particularly when 
the state legislature itself imposes the deadlines. The collective bar-
16. Detroit Police Dispute Panel, Findings and Recommendations on Unresolved 
"Economic" and Other Issues 32-33 (Feb. 27, 1968, unpublished mimeo). 
17. The statements in this paragraph are based upon C. REHMus &: E. WILNER, 
THE ECONOMIC REsULTS OF TEACHER BARGAINING (1968). 
18. l 1959-1960 BIENNIAL REP. Arr'Y GEN. 147 (Mich. 1959), 
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gaining process often entails months of negotiations, mediation, and 
fact-finding or arbitration; it does not respect time limits. Yet bud-
gets must be filed under the law, and this requires local officials to 
make preliminary estimates. As a result, municipalities may often 
feel constrained to take rigid positions based upon estimates which 
were submitted to the legislature before bargaining is completed. 
A second aspect of the coordination problem arises after budget sub-
mission deadlines have been passed: the issue then is whether nego-
tiated pay increases should apply prospectively from the date of the 
agreement or retroactively from the beginning of the budget period. 
Finally, it may be difficult to synchronize legislative decisions con-
cerning the amount of funds to be allocated to local governmental 
units with local governmental responsibilities in the bargaining 
process. For instance, teacher bargaining for the 1967-1968 school 
year in Michigan proved exceptionally difficult because the state 
legislature failed to act on the school aid formula until August 1967. 
Consequently, spring and summer bargaining in many school dis-
tricts dragged on beyond budget submission deadlines because school 
administrators were unable to predict how much state funding would 
be available to help them meet teacher demands. The state legisla-
ture avoided this problem the following year by acting on the school 
aid formula in April, well before budget deadlines. Perhaps as a 
result, a smaller number of bargaining impasses occurred during 
teacher negotiations for the 1968-1969 school year. This problem of 
coordinating the budget-making process with collective bargaining 
is more an irritating than an insurmountable obstacle. The difficul-
ties can be minimized by using open-ended budgets, resorting to 
short-term internal and external borrowing, allowing more time for 
bargaining before budget deadlines, and negotiating collective bar-
gaining contracts for longer terms than are currently settled upon. 
A second complication of collective bargaining in the public 
sector results from the tradition that public budgets and accounts 
are not secret documents. In the private sector the employer may 
under most circumstances refuse to disclose his profit and loss figures, 
but the public employer is forced to open his books to all interested 
persons. As a result, any operating reserves or contingency funds that 
may be available simply become targets for the employees to shoot at. 
Prudent management-whether in business or in public administra-
tion-ordinarily requires the retention of some operating reserves. 
It is not reprehensible for a public administrator to maintain a re-
926 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:919 
serve account to pay operating costs in periods before tax money 
becomes available or to provide for unforeseen contingencies. In 
practice, however, even if cities and school districts have not had to 
resort to deficit financing in order to meet collective bargaining 
demands, the retention of operating reserves has proved almost im-
possible. Many cities and most school districts in Michigan, their 
reserves depleted to satisfy the bargaining demands of employees, 
are now operating on little better than a year-to-year cash basis. In 
jurisdictions where reserves remain, this result has often been accom-
plished by padding various budget items-a recurrent practice but 
hardly one to be encouraged. 
A third anomaly of collective bargaining in the public sector is 
that the union can often invade the management decision-making 
structure. Particularly in public school and junior college districts, 
organized teacher groups have succeeded in electing their members, 
relatives, or sympathizers to school and governing boards. Under 
these circumstances it is often impossible for the management deci-
sion-making group to hide its bargaining strategy and tactics from 
employees. Democratic government does allow almost anyone to run 
for office, but this tactic may make collective bargaining a farce. 
III. OTHER STATE-IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS ON 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
State legislatures have imposed many limitations upon the au-
thority of local governmental units to manage their own personnel 
systems. One of the most common limitations is the statutory or 
de facto requirement that home rule cities establish a civil service 
and merit system for recruitment and promotion of personnel.19 This 
requirement, although beneficial in its thrust and general impact 
upon city government, operates to reduce substantially the flexibility 
of local governmental units at the collective bargaining table. State 
legislatures have seldom given enough thought to the problems that 
may be encountered when they impose a collective bargaining re-
quirement covering "terms and conditions of employment"20 upon 
an existing merit structure. 
The civil service concept ordinarily contemplates the establish-
ment of a nonpartisan board or commission at the local or state level 
19. 1967 Executive Committee of the National Governors' Conference, Preliminary 
Report of Task Force on State and Local Government Labor Relations 36-37. 
20. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967). 
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with rulemaking authority to assure adherence to the merit princi-
ple. In practice, merit systems have over the years grown to en-
compass many aspects of employee relations and personnel manage-
ment other than recruitment, classification, and promotion. These 
new areas of concern include the handling of grievances, employee 
training, salary administration, safety, morale, and attendance con-
trol programs-the very subjects that most employee organizations 
regard as appropriate for bargaining. If an independent civil service 
commission has authority over bargainable matters, then perhaps 
bargaining responsibilities should lie with the commission. But as it 
is, authority to bargain is usually vested in the chief executive officer 
of the local government unit. If he has the duty to bargain over the 
terms and conditions of employment while authority over many per-
sonnel matters remains with an independent commission, the scope 
of negotiations will be unduly restricted. 
This problem is not insoluble. If the principle of collective bar-
gaining by local governments is to be effectuated, all nonmerit func-
tions should be transferred from the civil service commission to a 
personnel department under the chief executive officer of each local 
unit. In practice, however, such a transfer of authority has seldom 
been made. In Massachusetts, for example, the state collective bar-
gaining law for public employees specifically states that it shall not 
"diminish the authority and power of the civil service commission, 
or any retirement or personnel board established by law .... "21 The 
Wisconsin public employment relations statute22 excludes from the 
mandatory scope of bargaining a large range of matters established 
by law or governed by civil service. In practice, in localities where 
public employee collective bargaining is fully developed, informal 
bargaining arrangements to deal with these problems are already 
appearing.23 At the very least, any state considering collective bar-
gaining legislation for public employees should carefully analyze its 
personnel system in order to minimize the potential conflict between 
bargaining relationships, existing merit systems, and the rules pro-
mulgated by civil service boards and commissions. 
21. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1967). 
22. WIS. STAT._§ 111.91 (Supp. 1967). 
23. For example, Michigan's Wayne County has created special labor boards with 
the power to negotiate collective agreements with employees. The labor board for a 
negotiation is composed of a representative of the county Civil Service Board, a rep-
resentative of the county Board of Supervisors, and a representative from the par-
ticular administrative unit involved (such as the county Highway Department). 
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State legislatures contemplating collective bargaining in the pub-
lic sector should also ensure that they have not imposed undue 
restrictions upon the permissible scope of bargaining. Some years ago 
the Michigan legislature imposed upon its municipalities a fifty-six.-
hour maximum duty week for firemen.24 This law not only raised 
municipal fire protection costs substantially, but also eliminated 
from the scope of bargaining one of the major subjects which should 
have been left there. In Pennsylvania, the state legislature prohibited 
combined police-fire departments,25 another potentially bargainable 
subject. Laws of this kind place many local governments, particularly 
smaller communities, in a Procrustean bed. These municipalities are 
obligated to bargain over wages and hours, yet uniform state laws 
fundamentally weaken their negotiating position by creating man-
datory high-cost requirements without the freedom to trade cost 
reductions in one area for new expenditures in another. 
State legislatures have also limited the negotiating flexibility of 
school boards. For example, the Attorney General of Michigan has 
recently ruled that under existing law boards of education lack 
statutory authority to award severance pay, to pay for any unused 
portion of sick leave at the end of a school year or upon termination 
of employment, or to reimburse teachers' tuition for college credit 
courses beyond the baccalaureate degree.26 Under the Michigan col-
lective bargaining statute, school boards had assumed prior to the 
Attorney General's ruling that they were obligated to bargain on all 
of these subjects, and concessions had in fact been made on many. 
Probably a majority of existing teacher collective bargaining agree-
ments in Michigan call for one or more of these payments that have 
now been declared to be unlawful. The attempt of school boards to 
negotiate such benefits back out of existing contracts is likely to 
engender bitter conflict. A new grant of authority to make the dis-
puted payments would seem to be a preferable alternative. 
Another important source of conflict is the discrepancy between 
union security arrangements in collective bargaining agreements and 
the provisions of state teacher tenure laws. The Michigan Labor 
Mediation Board has ruled that union security-specifically, an em-
ployee demand for an agency shop-is a mandatory subject of bar-
24. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.841 (1967). 
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1969) (by implication). 
26. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 4583 (Oct. 11, 1968), No. 4667 (Feb. 24, 1969) (clari-
fying no. 4583). 
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gaining, at least so far as home rule counties are concerned.27 A num-
ber of Michigan school boards, assuming that this ruling applied to 
them as well, have agreed to agency shop clauses in their master 
contracts. These provisions ordinarily call for terminating the em-
ployment of bargaining unit members who refuse to pay either union 
dues or an equivalent agency fee. Yet a basic condition of the Michi-
gan Teacher Tenure Act is that a school board must show a "reason-
able and just cause" relating to job performance for terminating a 
tenured teacher's employment.28 This conflict between Michigan's 
Public Employment Relations Act and its Teacher Tenure Act must 
ultimately be resolved by the state supreme court. In the meantime, 
the conflict illustrates graphically the kinds of problems that can 
arise when a legislature mandates collective bargaining and simul-
taneously continues to legislate terms or conditions of employment 
for the employees of local governmental units. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A classic dilemma faces the management negotiator who has been 
instructed, "Don't give them anything, but don't let them strike." 
Increasingly, administrators of local units of government find them-
selves trying to carry out such impossible orders. The constraints 
that state constitutions and state legislatures place on local govern-
ing units have existed for many years. Most of them find their origins 
in jealousy over taxing power and the fear that locally elected and 
appointed officials might prove unresponsive to the state legislature's 
standards of "good government." Many limitations have been re-
tained in an attempt to remove certain subjects from local collective 
bargaining altogether. In an environment where local administrators 
must negotiate their employees' wages and working conditions with 
employee representatives, these limitations on local authority are 
real obstacles to effective collective bargaining. 
Freedom to trade one proposal for another and to balance cost 
reductions in one area against new expenditures in another is essen-
tial to bargaining flexibility. Freedom to raise new money to meet 
employee demands, or to withstand the consequences of refusal, is 
an equally essential part of the collective bargaining process. Much 
of this freedom and flexibility is presently denied local administra-
27. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept. & Metro. Council No. 23, Case No. C66 F-63 
(Michigan Labor Mediation 13d. Jan. 10, 1968). 
28. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 38.101 (1967). 
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tors. As a result, local public employee bargaining has resulted in 
impasses and employee pressure tactics more often than should have 
been necessary. Many of these problems would not be so serious if 
public employee bargaining were merely a transitory phenomenon. 
But Pandora's box has been opened. Employees who have gained a 
real voice in setting their compensation levels and their working con-
ditions will not readily give up the collective bargaining process which 
has so often brought them real benefits. It is essential, therefore, that 
the administrators of local governmental units be given greater free-
dom than they now have to negotiate and to raise funds. Continued 
failure to grant them authority commensurate with their bargaining 
responsibilities is hardly likely to be in the public interest. 
